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THE ALIENABILITY OF NON-POSSESSORY
INTERESTS *
PERcy BoRDwELL**
II
The matter of the alienability of non-possessory interests at common
law was not an isolated phenomenon. Nor would it seem to have been
an incident of feudalism or of champerty and maintenance or of choses
in action. Attornment by the tenant was necessary to complete the grant
of a reversion and commonly this has been ascribed to feudalism 1 just
as livery of seisin was at one time taken to have been a feudal ceremony.2
In neither case would feudalism seem to have been the answer. Feudal
law was land law but neither seisin nor the significance of the acknowl-
edgment of the transfer by the one in possession was peculiar to land
law.3 The association of champerty and maintenance with the buying of
non-possessory titles apparently arose out of St. 32 Hen. VIII, C. 9 §2
(1540). 4 Under that statute the buying of pretended titles was pri-
marily a matter of criminal law and public policy and only secondarily
of the general law of property. As a crime it never made any great
impression but as an explanation for the non-transferability of rights of
entry occupied a conspicuous place in the law of property during the
time that lawyers talked in terms of right of entry. The term chose in
action never had any great application to interests in land 5 but was used
in the first place for debts G and then for rights of action also but pri-
marily for rights of action personal.7 This term does not go back to the
beginnings of the law but seems to have become current in the reign
of Henry VI.8 Actions were recognized as non-transferable much earlier 9
* This is a continuation of an article the first installment of which appeared in
(1941) 19 NORTH CAROLINA LAW RE VIw 279.
** Professor of Law, State University of Iowa.
See WILLiAmS ON REAL PROPERTY (23d ed. 1920) 369; CHALLIS'S REAL
PROPERTY (3d ed. 1911), 51.
2By Lord Mansfield in Taylor d. Atkyns v. Horde, 1 Bur. 60, 108 (K. B.
1757).
' For the analogy between attornment and the acknowledgment by the bailee of
a transfer by a bailor, see Maitland, Mystery of Seisin (1886) 2 L. Q. REv. 481,
492, 3 SEEcTED ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AmERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1909) 591, 605.
That in the case of land, attornment was not peculiar to tenure whether feudal or
otherwise, see 2 L. Q. REv. at 490-492, 3 Sn. Es. at 603-605.
'See WINFIELD, HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE
(1921) 159 and infra.
Bordwell, The Alienability of Non-Possessory Interests (1941) 19 N. C. L.
REv. 279, 280-282.0Id. at 283.
7 Id. at 284. 'Id. at 280, n. 7.
" BRACTON, fol. 13b; FLETA, Lib. I1, c. 6, §2.
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but not as choses in action. Happily the use of the term chose in action
has been confined in most part to the law of personal property 0 and the
confusion that has marked its use has to that extent been isolated.
The whole matter of the transferability and transmissibility of prop-
erty rights during the formative period of the English law was put in a
new light by Maitland in his earlier writings" and in collaboration with
Sir Frederick Pollock in their History of English Law.12 If in his
Mystery of Seisin Maitland seemed to attribute to the English of the
thirteenth century an incredible backwardness about the transfer of
rights without a transfer of some physical thing which was the object
of those rights,13 in the History this theory assumed a very minor
place.' 4 It was probably a more or less passing phase in Maitland's
progress from long current misconceptions to the clearer vision of the
History.
The keynote of the History is the statement that "in the past it
(seisin) was so important that we may almost say that the whole system
of our land law was law about seisin and its consequences."'u Despite
this the medieval law was "rich with incorporeal things."'1 6 The expla-
nation of this paradox would seem to be that while the common law
started from such matter-of-fact things as possession and delivery and
entry and in this respect was materialistic yet as a whole this materialism
was of the creative kind that makes ideas real rather than of the negative
kind that sees little beyond the bare fact. Things were not confined to
what one could touch and see, but incorporeal, abstract things like
reversions and rents and advowsons and later uses were treated as real
as the land itself. In consequence, the common law of land was not the
crude and inadequate thing it has sometimes been pictured. Whatever
its imperfections, it was an amazing piece of creative work. As supple-
mented by the trust, which was but another surge of the same creative
imagination, it gave rise to a system of property law which could hold
its own with that of the civil or any other body of law.
The trust was the more modern element. Its successes have been
touched on elsewhere'1 and need not be repeated here except insofar as
they involve the transferability of non-possessory interests. The logic
of the trust based on agreement and intent was opposed in many ways
10 Bordwell, supra note 5, at 279-280.
1 Maitland, Seisin of Chattels (1885) 1 L. Q. REv. 324; Maitland, Mystery of
Seisin (1886) 2 L. Q. REV. 481, 3 SEL. Es. 591.
2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1923).
13 Maitland, Mystery of Seisin (1886) 2 L. Q. Rw. 489-490, 3 SEIL. Es. 601-603;
see Bordwell, supra note 5, at 288-292.142 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 89.15Id. at 29. o Id. at 124.
'1 Bordwell, Equity and the Law of Property (1934) 20 IOWA L. R-v. 1;
Bordwell, The Conversion of the Use into a Legal Interest (1935) 21 IowA L.
Rav 1.
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to the logic of the common law based on possession and livery and entry.
The complete fusion of law and equity has not yet been accomplished
and is problematical for the future. The most striking examples of such
fusion have been the Statute of Uses in 1540,18 the Judicature Acts of
187319 and 187520 and the Law of Property Act of 1925.21 The Statute
of Uses changed many equitable into legal interests. The Law of Prop-
erty Act of 1925 reversed the process.2 2 The Judicature Act of 1873
provided that where law and equity were in conflict equity should
prevail.23
Perhaps as fully important as these direct attempts at fusion was the
penetration of equitable ideas into the law through the more gradual
processes of legal development. With this interpenetration the dominance
of chancery after the Restoration of Charles II had much to do. As a
consequence seisin and livery and entry in the latter half of the eight-
eenth century had become more or less meaningless and seemed either
relics of feudalism or empty, formalities and were in no position to meet
the impact of Benthamite reform. These reforms took shape in the
recommendations of the Real Property Commissioners of 1829-1833 and
the legislation that followed. That legislation eliminated the old tech-
nique of seisin in most thoroughgoing fashion and thus destroyed the
juristic basis for the non-transferability of non-possessory interests. It
went further and decreed their transferability. 24 But this was 'done as
incident to the fall of seisin and not from pragmatic reasons peculiarly
applicable to non-possessory interests. This is what was meant when it
was said at the outset that the alienability pf non-possessory interests.
was not an isolated phenomenon.2 5 At any rate it will be considered
here as incident to the reign of seisin, its decline and fall.
THE REIGN OF SEISIN
A
SEISIN AS A SOURCE OF TITLE
In the old Writ of Right the demandant alleged that he or some
ancestor had been seised of the tenements in his demesne as of fee and of
right within such a time by taking the profits thereof to such a value.2 6
Seisin and right therefore were the two elements that went to make up
the highest title known to the law and the seisin was an exploited seisin
" 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1536).
1" 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66 (1873). 20 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77 (1874).
" 15 Geo. V., c. 20 (1924). 22 Id. at §1.
36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, §25, subs. 11 (1873).
24By devise, 7 Wm. IV & 1 Vict., c. 27, §3 (1837) ; by deed, 8 & 9 Vict., c.
106, §6 (1845).
" Supra, p. 387.
" STEARNES O N REm. AcTIoNs (ed. 1824) 488; CoKE's ENTRrEs (1614) 182.
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by the taking of esplees or profits. Whatever the relative importance of
these two elements, right could claim the distinction of giving its name
to the writ. 27 The right was the right of property and the writs of right
were generally known as proprietary writs. Had the proprietary writs
retained the importance they had while the feudal courts still flourished
the balance between proprietary right and seisin might well have been
very different.28 But they did not retain their importance. They were
forced into the background first by the assizes and then by the writs of
entry 9 by means of which the King's Court rapidly took to itself the
administration of the land law. The important assizes of Novel Disseisiln
and Mort d'Ancestor said nothing of the right nor of an exploited
seisin.3 0 They were based on just plain seisin and on rights of property
springing therefrom. These rights of property did not have the finality
of the right of the Writ of Right but were good until a better was
proved. The better or more right of the Writ of Right, like the writ
itself, faded into the background. By an apparent mistake in translation
from more to mere3l it came to be known as mere right. This name in
itself was enough to make it lose face if it had not done so already.
Seisin and its consequences were left with the field pretty much to
themselves.
Seisin was possession and the emphasis on seisin was an emphasis on
having. One had or was vested with that of which he was seised. Such
things constituted his possessions. Possessions is Biblical or Elizabethan3 2
but has. the same atmosphere of peace and quietude that marked the
older seisin. Seisin spoke not of seizure or violence but rather of a time
when although these things may have happened they were now past.33
On the contrary disseisin -did speak of seizure and violence and that is
why if one approaches the law of the Middle Ages from the point of
view of disseisin he will utterly misread it.34 Normally seisin would not
27 Originally the name came from the direction to the feudal lord to do full
right to the demandant but with the establishment of the possessory actions in the
King's Court was used more broadly to indicate all writs originating proprietary
actions for land. See Maitland, Register of Original Writs (1889) 3 HARv. L.
REv. 110, n. 1.
2 Glanvill commenced with Right and ended with Possession and the Register
of Writs of later days followed this order but in Bracton the order was reversed
and he never finished his treatment of the Writ of Right. See id. at 109.
2" As to the relative order of the Assizes and of the Writs of Entry, see 2
POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 80, n. 1.
'0 BRAC. ff. 284, 373; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 34;
STEARNS, op. cit. supra note 26, at 364.
*"2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 78, n. 2.
" Id. at 153 n. "Id. at 30.
" Fundamentally that is the fault of Ames' Disseisht of Chattels. In giving to
estates by wrong the predominate place held by seisin, it gives an impression of
the normality of wrong that, it is to be hoped, was never true of any system of
law. Certainly the Year Books made no such impression on Coke. He regarded
disseisin as next door to robbery. Co. LIrr. *18b.
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be acquired by such acts but by the ordinary processes of transfer or
lawful entry. But whether the possessor was in by tort or by title,
seisin emphasized the fact that he was in, not how he got there.3 5 At
the outset two things must be distinguished, first, the acquisition of
seisin, second, its loss. Once acquired, seisin at common law was
notoriously hard to lose. Mere abandonment was not sufficient, nor the
lease of the land for years, nor, in a certain sense, the grant of an estate
for life or even in fee tail.36 A tenancy at sufferance did not put an end
to it nor a risseisin at election. 31 Bracton was of the opinion that after
one had ceased to be seised in body, he might still be seised in mind.38
Certain very serious acts3 9 did constitute a discontinuance of the posses-
sion40 but a disseisin was not a discontinuance and the life estate of one
who had been disseised was still sufficiently an estate in possession to
support a contingent remainder.4 1 As to discontinuance and disseisin
more will be said hereafter. Enough perhaps has been said to indicate
that seisin once acquired was hard to lose.
The retention of seisin was one thing, its acquisition another. Brac-
ton said that mind and body must concur in its acquisition but that
mind alone was sufficient for its retention.4 2 Until such acquisition the
one entitled did not have the thing to which he was entitled 43 and hence
had nothing he could transfer or transmit. The difficulty, it is believed,
lay not in crude notions of transfer but in the conviction that until a
right was clothed with seisin it remained an inchoate and imperfect
thing. Only then did it become a source of title. Livery, entry, attorn-
ment, were important, it would seem, because the exigencies of the times
needed some formal act to show that the acquisition of seisin, the vest-
ing, was complete. The fortunes of seisin may be- traced by following
the extent to which these formal acts of acquisition faded into the back-
",Just as disseisin has been overemphasized so it would seem has livery of
seisin. See infra, p. 394. These were merely methods of acquiring seisin, means to
an end and not the end itself.
"o The feoffee for life or in tail, was seised of the freehold, the feoffor of the
reversion.
" The tenancy at sufferance and disseisin at election, especially the latter, were
comparatively late developments aimed at the avoidance of loss of seisin.
" BRAc., fol. 38b, 39. See 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at
54, n. 2.
"o Three cases of discontinuance given by Littleton were the alienation by an
abbot of land held in fee, the feoffment by a husband of land held in right of his
wife, and the feoffment by a tenant in tail. LIT., §§593, 594, 595.
," That the discontinuance was a discontinuance of the possession, see 2 BuER,
Co. LIr. (1853) 325a, n. 1, "When the right of entry is thus lost, and the party
can only recover by action, the possession is said to be discontinied. This is the
general import of the word discontinuance."
' FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS (6th ed. 1809) 286.42Ff. 38b, 39.
""'Give me the handle of the church door' says the grantee of an advowson,"
Sir Frederick Pollock in 2 HOLMEs-PoLLocK LzTERS (1941) 186.
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ground and a fictitious seisin took the place of one that might be
imaginative but was nonetheless real.
The seisin with the taking of the esplees or profits of the Writ of
Right4" was a very substantial seisin in which emphasis was placed on
enjoyment. Like emphasis on enjoyment was placed in the possessory
assize for the recovery of an advowson-the all-important right to
present a clerk for institution as parson-though here the thing that
constituted the enjoyment and gave its name to the assize was the last
presentation of a candidate.45 In the case of rent, stress on enjoyment
was still evident in the requirement of a token payment as a prerequisite
to an assize, although for other purposes attornment was enough. The
token payment was said to give seisin in deed, the attornment only seisin
in law.4 6 In the Assizes of Novel Disseisin and Mort d'Ancestor, how-
ever, no allegation of the taking of the profits was made.47 And in the
case of incorporeal hereditaments generally attornment was sufficient to
complete a transfer.
The change from the seisin with the taking of esplees of the Writ of
Right to the bare seisin of the Novel Disseisin and the Mort d'Ancestor
and from the actual enjoyment of incorporeal things to token payments
and even to attornment did not, it is believed, mark any fundamental
change from the notion of the necessity of seisin for the completion of
title. If attornment only gave seisin in law its significance lay in the fact
that it was considered to give a kind of seisin. As to incorporeal heredita-
ments, the application of notions of seisin was bound-to be more or less
fanciful. As to corporeal hereditaments seisin in law never made much
headway as a source of title and that only later. The old writs were still
in the background and the writs of entry which were somewhat modeled
on them had the same allegation as to the taking of the profits. The
taking of the profits involved a certain time element which might well
amount to a year and be comparable to the common law possession for
a year and a day 48 or the year's possession of the Pretended Title Act.40
In the Novel Disseisin and the Mort d'Ancestor effective seisin was
somewhat accelerated but this was natural in view of their summary
character. This abbreviated seisin did not mean a departure from the
requirement of a real seisin. Quite the contrary. The whole emphasis
of these assizes was on possession although now more stress might be
laid on such overt acts as livery and entry than had formerly been the
"Supra, p. 389.
'12 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 137-138.
" LiT., §§235, 565; Co. LiTT. 315a; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra
note 12, at 132.
'
7 Supra, p. 390.
" See Maitland, Possession for Year and Day (1889) 5 L. Q. Ray. 253.
" 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, §2 (1540).
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case. Overt acts were particularly adapted to the new procedure with
its jury system. That there was at least increased insistence on an
actual seisin is generally agreed. How to explain this, especially in the
case of the feoffment, has been and still is the subject of controversy.50
Attention will therefore be directed to the case of the feoffment. But it
should be remembered that the feoffment was not an isolated problem.
The new writs and procedure and, more fundamental still, seisin as a
source of title were also involved.
In the early Germanic law transfers seem to have been made by an
elaborate ceremony culminating with the delivery of the land and the
renunciation of the donor.5 1 All this was on the land itself. But at a
yet remote period the transaction became differentiated into gift and
ceremony. The gift and then much at least of the ritual now more
symbolic than ever, often came to take place off the land in some public
place such as marketplace, court or church. The delivery of the land
might be symbolized by the transfer of a twig or turf or of a knife or
glove or, when written instruments came in, by their delivery.5 2 Prob-
ably the deed was at first primarily evidentiary rather than symbolic53
but its symbolic use was possible.54 The natural tendency of the deed
was to render the presence of witnesses on the land unnecessary for it
was more enduring and in many ways better evidence of such things as
boundaries and in general of the intent of the parties than the uncertain
memory of the witnesses. For a time the theory prevailed that the
Anglo-Saxon charter was something more than evidentiary, that it was
dispositive and constituted the grant itself. This theory is now regarded
as highly speculative.5 5 It would have divorced still further the transfer
from the land.
If one turns from this picture of the earlier law to the time of Glan-
vill and Bracton he must needs be shocked by the insistence on an actual
delivery of the land itself. Was this a throw-back of several centuries
to the early Germanic law? Had livery of seisin continued all the time
as a method of transfer though very much in the background as it was
in the later law after the lease and release became the current method of
transfer?. Had it continued to be necessary to the completion of a
transfer by symbols or deed though lost sight of in the stress laid on
o This controversy reflects somewhat the celebrated controversy as to the
nature of the Anglo-Saxon charter and the resulting status of bookland. For a
brief survey of that controversy see Plucknett, Roman Law and English Common
Law (1939) 3 U. OF TORONTO L. J. 24, 26-28.2 POLLOCx AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 84-85.
Id. at 85-88; Thorne, Livery of Seisin (1936) 52 L. Q. REV. 345, 348-355.
" Thorne, supra note 52, at 349-350.
*' 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 86; but see Thorne, supra
note 52 at 351, n. 18.
" Plucknett, supra note 50, at 27. For recent criticism of this theory of
Brunner, see Thorne, supra note 52, at 352, n. 21.
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these more conspicuous factors? Any answer to these questions must
also be more or less speculative. Professor Thorne would deny that it
was a throw-back on the ground that the new seisin was more like the
Roman, possession while the old seisin had more in it of right.5 0 He
would also admit that livery of seisin had continued to be a possible
method of transfer 57 but would deny that it was a necessary supplement
to symbolic transfers. 58 Mr. Turner believes it incredible that the old
livery of seisin was ever superseded by the charter of feoffment without
livery.5 9 Both agree that insofar as the charter of feoffment was an
evidentiary rather than a dispositive instrument, it was evidence of the
gift and not of the livery as it customarily preceded the livery and in
such a case could not be evidence of something that did not exist.a0 Both
agree that the livery was rather subsidiary and not the outstanding fact
of the feoffment.6 1 Whatever their differences of opinion they have put
the feoffment in a new light and made a distinct contribution. Whatever
the continued necessity of an actual delivery, the practice of transferring
land by livery does not seem to have gone out nor the necessity of an
entry before the completion of title. The necessity of seisin as a source
of title seems so ingrained into the beginnings of the historic common
law writs of right and possessory assizes alike, that it is hard to believe
that there was ever a time in the earlier law when a transfer was com-
plete without an entry or something like it.
That in the time of Glanvill and Bracton there was at least a new
emphasis on actual delivery or on actual change of possession no one
questions. Here Professor Thorne gives greater weight to the influence
of the procedure in the new King's Court as compared with that of the
old feudal courts ;62 Pollock and Maitland to the classic texts of the
Roman law.63 No one can read Bracton without attaching some im-
portance to the latter. Both influences were no doubt at work. There
were also what may be called political influences. The conflict between
the new King's Court on the one side and the feudal courts and the
courts of the church on the other was essentially political. Take for
instance the post obit gifts-in effect reservations of the property for
" Thorne, supra note 52, at 347, 355, 363.
17 Id. at 352. Id. at 355.
5
" TuRNER, BOOKLAND AND FOLKLAND IN HISTORICAL ESSAyS IN HONOR OF
JAMES TAIT (1933) 357, 362.0 1d. at 358-359; Thorne, supra note 52, at 345, n. 3.
01 TURNER, op. cit. supra note 59, at 358-359. Thorne, supra note 52, at 361.
Professor Thorne believes there has been a tendency "to elevate the actual delivery
of seisin to an undeserved prominence in the transfer of the freehold," id. at 347.
It is believed that this is true of Bracton's time but not to the same extent of
Littleton's. Littleton pursued the logic of the livery with lawyerly courage. Its
subsequent prominence largely stems from him. See infra, p. 397.
62 Thorne, supra note 52, at 355-361.
632 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 88-89. Pollock and Mait-
land, however, do not ignore the influence of the new institution, the jury. See ibid.
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life.6 4 These had more or less flourished in the older law but were now
rigidly excluded. They probably owed their demise as much if not more
to the fact that they looked testamentary and therefore, if valid at all,
properly within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, as to the
technical requirement of an actual change of possession in the lifetime
of the donor. A technical reason for the compromise by which they
were disallowed altogether was likely to have more finality than any
suggestions of compromise. 65
Too little weight it would seem has been given to the distinction
running all through Bracton between the dontio and the traditio.6"
There has been a tendency to identify livery of seisin with the feoffment
itself as though the livery were the whole thing. It is believed that in
Bracton's day the danger was just the other way and that it was the
livery that was likely to be slighted in favor of the charter. Bracton set
his face against this but his very persistence in asserting the need of an
actual livery is some indication that he feared it might otherwise be over-
looked. Tradition has it that the Conqueror had distributed land to his
followers without charters and that other ancient feoffments had been
charterless 67 but this tradition apparently spoke of a practice that had
now become unfamiliar. The old practice was still possible and con-
tinued to be so 6 8 and on this very slight foundation has often been built
an argument that the livery was the essence of the feoffment. But it is
a very slight foundation. On the other hand the importance of the
charter spoke for itself. What had to be laid stress on was that it was
not indispensable nor all-sufficient. The stress laid on an actual livery
would indicate that only too often feoffors and feoffees overlooked this
formality and feoffees entered without livery. In such a case, Bracton
says, the feoffee might find himself guilty of a disseisin if the feoffor
changed his mind and revoked the gift.69 This was contrary to the
"Id. at 92, 317-329.
"The compromise involved other elements as well. See id. at 325-329.
1o Thus: "We may for, purposes of analysis distinguish as Bracton does, the
donatio from the traditio, the feoffment from the livery, the declaration of the
owner's will from the induction of the donee into seisin; but in law the former is
simply nothing until it has been followed by the latter." 2 POLLOCK AND MAIT-
LAND, op. cit. sutpra note 12, at 84. But the analysis shows the ideas that were at
work in Bracton's mind. Had Bracton and others of his time seen only the livery.
the law of the thirteenth century could hardly 'have shown the vigor it did. One
merit of the contributions of Mr. Turner and of Professor Thorne is that they
deflated livery of seisin.
" This is largely based on the language of the Statute of Marlborough, 52
Hen. III, c. 9 (1267). See TURNER, op. cit. supra note 59, at 360; 2 POLLOCK AND
MAIrLAND, op. cit supra note 12, at 83. See also BRAC. fol. 382.
" The reference in the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, §1 (1677), to
interests created "by livery and seisin only" is some indication that informal
transfers of land continued to persist at that time. For the rarity of the practice
as indicated on the plea rolls of even the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries,
,see TURNER, op. cit. supra note 59, at 359.
1 Fol. 40. Pollock and Maitland (op. cit. szpra note 12, at 84) puts this case
19421
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later law where such a person was treated not as a disseisor but as a
tenant at will.70 That disseisin was brought in here at all speaks for the
determination of the judges to enforce an actual livery and for the
popularity of the Assize of Novel Disseisin but, it would seem, for very
little else, certainly not for the identification of the feoffment with the
livery. The donatio loomed much larger in the books of the time than
the traditio. Today delivery is necessary for a deed but in the whole
law of deeds it would seem to occupy a relatively minor place. The
case of the feoffment without a charter has been made much of in the
subsequent history of the law and used to elevate the traditio to a height
which it is believed Bracton and his fellows would have been the first
to deny.
The importance of the charter has likewise been minimized because
its language seemed to speak of a past gift. Accordingly it has been said
to have been evidentiary rather than dispositive. Bracton himself was
familiar with the words in question and explained them away. 71 They
no longer meant to him what they may have meant to the men who first
used them nor did they have for him the importance that has sometimes
since been attached to them. When elaborate symbolic gifts were the
fashion the words in the past tense in the charters may well have
referred to them. Professor Thorne takes the words as evidence of the
prevalence at one time of these symbolic transfers. 72 But when these
symbolic transfers went out of fashion and an actual livery was insisted
upon it seems pretty clear that usually the livery followed the charter
and so could not have been in any real sense evidenced by it. a The
words of past tense had evidently become mere form to Bracton and
there is no reason why they should mean any more to us.
Perhaps Bracton himself would have been pretty hard put to it to
have analyzed just what he meant by the gift as distinct from the
livery.74 It evidently did not necessarily mean a charter. The declara-
tion of the will of the donor by mere words was sufficient. But whatever
form it took the expression of the donor's will was of the gift's very
much stronger than does Bracton. Nowhere in Bracton, it is believed, appears the
bald statement that an entry by a feoffee before livery is a disseisin. It is a reten-
tion of possession after the feoffor has changed his mind that Bracton mentions.
10 LiT., §70.
" Fol., 34b. See Thorne, supra note 52, at 345-347.
" Id. at 364. " See note 60 supra.
' Perhaps the following statement is as explicit as any. "Likewise it is not
sufficient, that a charter has been made and signed, unless it be proved that the
donation has been completed, and that all things which constitute a donation have
duly preceded and delivery has followed, otherwise the thing given can never
be transferred to the donatory. For homage may have preceded, and the charter
may have been duly made and be true and good, and have been read over and heard
with solemnity, nevertheless it will never be valid, except at that last moment when
delivery has followed, and so the charter may be true, but without the fact of
seysine, it is mute." BRAc., fol. 38 (Transl. Twiss).
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essence. The form of the gift is emphasized over and over again. At a
later time Littleton could say: "For that every remainder which be-
ginnith by a deed it behoveth that the remainder be in him to whom the
remainder is entailed by force of the same deed, before the livery of
seisin is made to him which shall have the freehold." 75 Here is the same
broad distinction between gift and livery that appears in Bracton, the
same conception of an inchoate transaction completed by induction into
seisin and the same contrast between right and possession that Bracton
makes in connection with descent.7 6 If no such clear-cut statement of
the passing of the right by the deed appears in Bracton there is much
in Bracton's treatment of incorporeal interests that is not far removed
from this statement of Littleton's.7 As the Middle Ages had worn on,
the character of the deed as a conveyance of the right had sharpened.78
Mr. Turner doubts whether the right could be conveyed without it.7?
What change there was in this respect between Bracton. and Littleton
was therefore strictly evolutionary. Much light is thrown on Bracton by
the later development.
If in some respects the deed had increased in importance in Little-
ton's time, in other respects the importance of the livery had increased
at the expense of the gift or at any rate of the form of the gift. Littleton
himself proceeded from the necessity of a livery with relentless logic. In
Bracton's time, livery helped get rid of post obit gifts and emphasized
the necessity of an entry during the feoffor's life. But it did not require
that all the feoffees should be in existence at the time of the livery ;80 it
did not prevent the mortgage term swelling to a fee at some future
time;81 it did not preclude the limitation of one conditional fee after
another82 nor the existence of the condition precedent.83 To all appear-
ances, Bracton would have found little difficulty in supporting most of
the executory interests which the later common law denied and so had
to come into the law by way of equity. In Littleton's pages the livery
was distinguished from the gift84 but it had grown at the expense of the
7: LIT., TENuREs, §721.
7 BRAc., ff. 62b, 253. " BRAc., ff. 52b, 53, 53b, 54.
"'The matter of the deed as a conveyance of the right will be gone into in a
subsequent article.
o TuRNER, op. cit. supra note 59, at 359.
so BRac., ff. 13, 28b, 34b; 1 BRIrTON (ed. Nichols) 231; id. at n. k.; 2 POLLOCK
AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12; at 28, n. 1.
82 Id. at 122-123.82 Id. at 23-24; Maitland, Remainders after Conditicinal Fees (1890) 6 L. Q.
Ray. 22.
" The outstanding example of the condition precedent in the early law was that
of the mortgage term raised to a fee. Littleton denied the possibility of the con-
dition precedent (Co. Lirr. 216b-218a) and his views were probably of weight in
establishing the classic common law mortgage with its condition subsequent. From
Coke's discussion it is evident that the early authorities were against Littleton.
See also 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 123, n. 1.
" Supra, pp. 396-7.
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form of the gift. The feoffment was not identical with the livery but it
came close to being. All the flexibility of the old feoffment was gone.
The logic of the formal act of livery took its place. Even the contingent
remainder to an unascertained person was denied.8 5 From a subsidiary
act livery of seisin had come to be a destructive force.
The feoffment was not the only instance in which change of posses-
sion had assumed larger proportions in the interval between Bracton
and Littleton. Another instance, and one concerning a maxim familiar
to every student of the law, was that of the possessio fratris. In full the
maxim read: Possessio fratris de feodo simplici facit sororem esse
haereden.8 6 The effect of this as expounded by Littleton was that the
entry of the elder brother made the full sister heir as against the younger
half-brother who would have inherited had the elder brother failed to
enter on the death of the father.8 7 In Littleton's time this was a rule
excluding the half-brother from taking at all either as heir to the brother
or to the father and not one of postponement with preference to the
sister. In Bracton's day the half-brother had been much better off. In
the first place the rile as to the half-blood, of that day had apparently
been one not of exclusion of the half-brother but of preference of the
full sister.88 In the second place the rule of the half-blood was of doubt-
ful application to inherited property.89 Nor did the last seisin seem to
cut very much figure. As Bracton's text is he seems to have been in-
clined at first towards letting entry make a difference and to treat the
heir who had entered on the property as in the same position as a first
purchaser as far as the half-brother was concerned and in such a case to
give the full sister the preference. But then the text goes on to say that
this is not law and that in such a case the half-brother will be preferred
because of the right of property coming down from the common father.9 0
Neither Fleta nor Britton makes any mention of entry.9 '
An early appearance of the maxim possessio fratris is in a case in 6
Edward II (1313)9 " where Inge J. refers to it as coming from the
11LiT., §721.
"Id. at §8. 87 Ibid.
8 BRAc., fol. 66b; 2 POLLOCK AND MITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 303.
"Insofar as the course of descent from the common father was not turned by
the inheritance of the older brother the rule of the half-blood had no application
to inherited property and that it did not change the course of descent seems to have
been the considered opinion of Bracton (ff. 65, 65b) and of Fleta (Lib. 6, c. I,
§14). On the other hand Britton would seem to treat the last inheritor as pur-
chaser and the rule of the half-blood applicable without apparent regard to entr.
or the blood of the first purchaser (2d ed. Nichols, 316-371). The law of in-
heritance seems to have been very unsettled in his time (see 2 POLLOCK A.
'MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 304). The classic common law canons of
descent were yet for the future.
'o BRAc., ff. 65, 65b.
9 2 POLLOCK A.ND 'MAITLAN D, op. cit. supra note 12, at 304.
" Aud!ey v. Deyncourt. Y. B. 6 & 7 Edw. 11 68-76 (1313) (Seld. Soc.. vol. 3,)1.
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Roman law upon which he says the law of the land is founded29* He
uses it however to support the claim of the half-sister as against an
uncle and not in exclusion of the half-sister as in Littleton. In this case
Inge J. clashed with Bereford C. J. who was taken with the argument
that "when the tenements came into the possession of Alan. after Wil-
liam's death, the law as to the descent from William was changed by the
fact of Alan's possession. The law (applicable). then. having been once
changed, cannot by any means revert to what it was before. " 94 This is
an early statement of the rule of the later law tracing descent from the
one last seised but apparently it was just making its way at this time for
despite Bereford C. J.'s support the record does not show that any
judgment was entered. 95 By Littleton's time the maxim had taken it';
modem meaning and extraordinary as it may seem was even applied to
the use9" although the logic of the use was all against making so much
turn on entry or the analogous taking of profits. As indicated in the
maxim itself it did not apply to the fee tail nor did it apply to honorary
dignities nor to the descent of the crown.97
In modem times the rule of possessio fratris has been the stock illus-
tration of the common law canon of descent that traced inheritance from
the person last seised. It is believed that it was more than an illustration
and that the canon itself was a generalization from the maxim. If so the
canon is not older than the maxim. Bracton. himself, as we have seen9s
seemed inclined to the last seisin in the case of the half-blood but then
stated that such was not the law. In the period between 1313 and Little-
ton the last seisin established itself. But to reject last seisin as the
necessary source of title in the older law is not to reject seisin as the
,ource of title altogether. The alternative has generally been to trace
descent from the first purchaser and the fact that, by another canon, the
heir had to be of the blood of the first purchaser. is some evidence that
this was so. But for the first purchaser to have been a source of title he
must have been seised so that the alternative after all was not so much
between the one last seised and the first purchaser as between their re-
.*pective seisins. Nor were their seisins alone involved but the seisins
of those intervening in the chain of title. Each new seisin started a new
title and where these were adverse, at least, the oldest was the best. In
the case of descent it was ordinarily not necessary to go beyond the last
but where there were only collaterals it is believed that the law started
out by going beyond the last and finally to that of the first purchaser.
At any rate such a theory works in well with the common law of descent.
'i ld. at 70. " Id. at 7:-7,o.
Y. B. 8 Edw. II 216, n. 1 (1315) (Seld. Soc.. vol. 41).eY. B. 5 Edw. IV, f. 7. pl. 17 (1465) ; WATKINS o-, LAW OF DEst F..TS 12d
cd. 1801) 107. n. (e).
Id. at 108-109. "Supra, p. 398.
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The common law scheme of descent has been called the parentelic
system.9 9 According to this system, one's descendants took first, then
the descendants of one's parents, then the descendants of one's grand-
parents and so on. Each of these groups constituted a parentela and
those in the nearer parentela took to the exclusion of those in the more
remote parentela although some in the more remote parentela might be
nearer in degree to the dead man than any in the nearer parentela. But
not every ancestor's parentela was included unless the property were
newly acquired. At a fairly early time we come across the canon that
only those of the blood of the first purchaser would- be included.' 00 If
the dead man were first purchaser this canon excluded none of the
parentela but the longer the property had passed by unbroken descent
the greater number of parentela would be excluded. Those that would
be left would be of ancestors who had been seised of. the property either
as incident to the first purchase or as incident to a subsequent succession
to the property. In other words successive seisins begat successive titles
most of which got further and further away from the land at each
descent but which were ready to take effect when the subsequent pa-
rentela fell in. The anomaly of the half-blood was that the entry of the
elder brother at first postponed this title of the younger half-brother to
that of the full sister and then cut off the title of the half-brother alto-
gether. It changed the course of descent, and by letting the last seisin
override the prior seisins made the whole scheme unintelligible. The
innovation was not extended to the descent of honorary dignities nor of
the crown nor of the fee tail.x10 In the case of dignities and of the
crown the right was not so likely to be subordinated to entry. In the
case of the fee tail there was the additional factor that title could so
much more easily be traced to the first purchaser than in the case of the
fee simple. In the latter case the first purchaser was likely to be lost in
the passage of time. Finally in this system of descents there was no
place for ascendants. They simply did not fit in.
The parentelic system in its origin therefore seems to have been a
system of descents and of collaterals taking by descent from an ancestor.
In this system the collaterals of a first purchaser were without a natural
place. Some other system might well have been devised for them. But
to have had two distinct systems of descent for the two types of property
would have been a great waste and apparently was not attempted. In-
herited land would appear to have been the rule, acquired land the
exception. Accordingly the parentelic system was applied to newly
"Pollock and Maitland's. treatment of this system (op. cit. supra note 12, at
295-308) is not the least interesting of their treatment of the whole law of descent.Xoo But that there was some doubt as to this in the time of Britton, see s.upra
p. 398.
... See .supra, p. 399.
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acquired land also except that here the blood of the ancestor was what
counted as he had had no seisin. Emphasis was thus placed on the blood
of the ancestor even in the case of inherited property instead of on his
seisin but nevertheless seisin would still seem to be the explanation of
the parentelic system.
This exposition has paralleled to a considerable extent the theory of
collateral descent popularized by Blackstone but without resort to the
history of the feud which was current in his time.10 2 If some of the
matters are more or less conjectural this could- not have been avoided
for there seems to have been no well worked out system at the time
Bracton wrote.: 03 Seisin however does afford a working hypothesis that
fits in well with the facts we know.
The notion that the purchaser acquired by his purchase a right of
property that would descend indefinitely was as important in the law
of transfers as in that of descent. The development of the adequate fee
simple out of a gift to A and his heirs is hard to account for otherwise.
The court held that A was the purchaser and that the heirs were not
purchasers, that the word heirs was a word of limitation marking out
the right of A but giving nothing directly to the heirs. Had the word
heirs been taken to mean what it means in common parlance today, only
those who take at A's death, and not an indefinite line of succession, the
bounds of A's right would have been limited indeed. Instead Bracton
says heirs was taken in a wide sense to include heirs "near as remote.
as well present as future" and even assigns although .in truth they were
not heirs.' 04 To these heirs and assigns A's right would pass until heirs
and assigns alike had run out and A's right had run its course. Each
seisin in fee doubtless started a new title but the strength of the new
title was the right of property coming down from the remote ancestor.
The new tenant had something of his own but it was reinforced by the
right coming from the first purchaser. The descent of the right from the
first purchaser came to be overshadowed by the descent from the one
last seised but it had played its part in the creation of an adequate
common law fee.
In his Mystery of Seisin, Maitland gave five common instances of
seisin as a source of title.'0 5 Only two of these, conveyances and de-
vises, involved transfers. Three, descent, dower and curtesy involved
devolution by operation of law. Only in conveyances did -delivery figure
and in only one form of conveyance the feoffment. In the institution
of a new source of title, therefore, livery of seisin was greatly outnum-
bered by other forms of the devolution of property. The secret of the
1022 BL. Come. *220-224.
See 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 301.
zo' BRAc., ff. 17, 17b.
102 (1886) 2 L. Q. Rnv. 481, 3 Si.. Es. 591.
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completion of title lay in what was common to all these forms, including
livery, the entry of the one entitled. In the case of the feoffment, even
entry without livery might under some circumstances be efficacious.' 0 6
The significance of the entry was that it meant seisin. Not in anything
mysterious about a delivery, therefore, would seem the explanation
about the transmissibility of land, but in the importance of seisin as a
source of title. One had to have a thing before he could transmit it.
One cause for the emphasis on delivery in the Middle Ages was the
general restraint of the devise of land. That one could do by feoffment
with livery what one could not in general do by will must have accen-
tuated the outstanding difference between the two, the livery, and tended
to exalt the latter. But probably few were blind to the fact that the
reasons for the general restraint lay in policy and not in anything unique
about a delivery. The custom of various boroughs allowing the devise
was sufficient to make this plain.10 7
When the devise of land came to be allowed by St. 32 Hen. VIII
(1540) C. 1108 the language of the Statute and its interpretation shows
how deeply the old seisin still permeated legal thinking notwithstanding
the rise of the use and the incorporation of much of the use into the law
through the passing of the Statute of Uses' 0 9 four years earlier. Power
to devise was given to those having lands and great stress was laid on
this language of the Statute by the early judges. 110 They realized that
to confine the power to devise to the lands of which the devisor was
seised at the time of making the devise was to render the testamentary
power over lands in many ways unsatisfactory but they thought the
meaning of the Statute clear and gave it effect. Later judges were in-
clined to get away from the language of the Statute and to put the result
down to the influence of the old practice when devises were made through
feoffments to uses"' and Sir Villiam Holdsworth thinks these judges
were right."12 If so, the old seisin influenced the new practice through
the feoffment. But the later explanation is more complicated than the
old and would appear an afterthought. The language of the Statute was
what one might have expected and its interpretation also. The feeling
was still strong that a man did not have land until he had entered upon
it and that until he had it he had nothing he could give away. This
crippled testamentary power over land for three centuries but was a
natural outcome of the old seisin.
"I8 BIAc., ff. 40, 44. "07 See Li., §167.
... This statute was supplemented by 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5 (1542-3).
... 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1536).
110 See Butler and Baker's Case, 3 Co. 25a, 30a-31b, 35a.
11 1Trevor, C. J., in Arthur v. Bockenham, Fitzgibbon, 233, 238; 94 Eng. Rep.
734, 736 (1734) ; Mansfield, C. J., in Harwood v. Goodright, 1 Cowper 87, 90, 98
Eng. Rep. 981, 983 (1774).
'27 HoLDsWORT, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW (ed. 1926) 365.
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The right descended but not the seisin.113 In the time of Bracton
the entry required to perfect the heir's title and the consequent seisin
were real enough. 14  But when seisin had become the fashion there
was the inevitable tendency to extend it by construction, to find a
seisin in law in contrast to the seisin in deed of the time when
seisin had its way to make. "Here it may be remarked that seisin
did to some extent become a word with many meanings or rather
shades of meaning. The seisin which is good enough for one purpose is
insufficient for another. 'What shall be said a sufficient seisin' to give
dower, to give curtesy, to constitute a stock of descent, to maintain a
writ of right-each of these questions has its own answer." 115 Con-
structive or fictitious seisin, however, did not go very far in the Middle
Ages."1O In general, seisin still meant entry or something comparable
to it. By the Statute of Uses a statutory seisin became possible that was
quite fictitious although seisin remained very much of a reality as
possession even in transfers until the early nineteenth century. Then the
logic of the Statute of Uses worked itself out and seisin in transfers
came to mean little more than that the interest was legal rather than
equitable and so could be applied to contingent and executory in-
terests." 7 Such a seisin was a great remove from the seisin of Bracton.
In the cases of descent, dower and curtesy seisin retained much more
of its medieval reality than it did in transfers, until its fall at the hands
of the Benthamite reforms of the nineteenth century. In dower and
curtesy the husband or wife must have been seised during coverture. In
the case of curtesy this meant actual seisin, an entry during the mar-
riage. In this respect, however, the law was more favorable to the wife
than to the husband, and for her to obtain dower the seisin in law of the
husband was sufficient. If inheritance was cast on him during marriage
of land of which his ancestor was seised, he was presumed to have been
in seisin for purposes of dower at least for an instant and dower was
allowed although he never actually entered. 118
Emphasis on entry was not confined to the freehold. Until the lessee
for years entered he had no estate that could qualify him to receive a
release.119 Nor had the lessor a reversion. 120 In other respects the
leasehold differed from the freehold. Prior to entry the lessee had an
2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12 at 61.
"' 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 60; Maitland, Mystery
of Seisin (1886) 2 L. Q. REv. 481, 485, 3 SEL. Es. 591, 596.
. Id. 2 L. Q. REv. at 486, 3 SEL. Es. at 597.
110 "This seisin in law is good enough seisin for a few, but only a few, pur-
poses." 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 60.
"4 See Bordwell, The Conversion of the Use into a Legal Interest (1935) 21
IOWA L. REV. 1, 26-27.
118 WATKINS, LAW DEScENTS (4th ed. 1837) 24-44, 46-47.
... LIT., §459. '2* Id. at §567; Co. LiTT. 46b.
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interesse termini that could be transferred and he could enter after the
lessor's death and his executor could enter after his own. 121 The trans-
ferability of the interessee termini is remarkable and bespeaks the com-
mercial character of the lease. The entry after the death of either party
would seem to reflect its contractual side. In the treatment of the lease-
hold as an estate, however, the criterion of the land law was applied,
Thus far very little has been said about the non-possessory or in-
corporeal interests featured in the title. This is because their treatment
is not understandable without an understanding of the way in which
possessory or corporeal interests were treated. The treatment of non-
possessory interests was an imaginative extension to them of the scheme
of things at work in the possessory field. And the Middle Ages was rich
in imagination.
12 Co. Lir., 46b.
